The Central Asia region is currently the heart of global affairs, bringing together the majority of great powers, the majority of nuclear powers, and the region which play an essential geopolitical role in Asia. To strengthen theirs influence in the region, India and China have deployed different strategies namely the ambitious of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and “Connect Central Asia” policy of India. 

For China, Central Asia has always been important to China’s imagination of and action toward its neighbors and the larger world beyond [1]. Central Asia has long been central to China's thinking and conduct toward its neighbors and the greater globe. For many years, Central Asia served as the huge middle portion of the old Silk Road going back to the Han Dynasty (207 BCE-220 CE) [2], connecting, and bridging China's long-distance overland trade with Europe and the Middle East. China has joined this new regional space with a geoeconomics policy aimed largely at encouraging commerce, ensuring energy sources, and constructing cross-border infrastructure. While trade routes were included in the first "Great Game," China's significant influence in developing regional and bilateral commercial connections throughout Central Asia has established the foundation for a new "Great Game". 

For India, geographical constraints limit India's access to the region. There is no land boundary between India and the region's five states. The presence of a foe such as Pakistan has always made it difficult for India to reach Central Asia. Central Asia is crucial to India because it will help it preserve it standing in the international system as both a "regional power" and an "emerging power" [3]. With China's growing influence on each of India's neighbors, it appears that India's influence in its "near neighborhood" is dwindling. Even nations that used to have friendly relations with India, such as Nepal and the Maldives, are increasingly leaning toward China. Every country that aspires to be or has become powerful throughout history has had a "sphere of influence". India prefers that the sphere be located in Central Asia for two reasons. One, even if India loses power in its local vicinity and the Indian Ocean region to China, India may compensate by having influence in Central Asia. Second, if India can maintain stability in its neighborhood while simultaneously increasing its influence in the Central Asian region, the situation will improve much more. In both situations, India would benefit from these situations.

In this research paper, the author uses the author uses qualitative research methods and neorealist methodology to prove China and India are regional economic giants and growing powers in Asia region. Both countries are rapidly industrializing and have sophisticated military and naval capabilities to expand its influence on others region. Researchers such as [3-6] have claimed that China and India have launched a regional geopolitical contest for supremacy that may spread to other Asian sub-regions as interests and influence have shown, especially Central Asia, besides China is restraining India in South Asia in the XXI century. Moreover, China and India’s strategic in the Central Asia is uniquely different due to geopolitical factors and the political situation in this region. Since China and India see the region as an important element in their future regional and global power projection is this uniqueness of Central Asia political and economic structures would lead China and India to increase theirs influence by cooperating more than competing? Based on the significant role of Central Asia's geopolitics towards great powers in the 21st century, the author explains two countries’ strategy in this region, especially compare and evaluate the competition of China and India's activities as well as influence in Central Asia.

Findings Central Asia’s Geopolitics in the XXI Century: According to the [7] Central Asia is the central area of Asia, stretching from the Caspian Sea in the west to the western Chinese border in the east. It is bordered by Russia on the north and Iran, Afghanistan, and China on the south. It is also located in the center of Eurasia and was historically made-up half of the ancient Silk Route. It is also an area rich in natural resources, particularly oil and gas. Historically, five countries in Central Asia had belonged to the Soviet Union. Since gaining independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, these five countries have had very different economic and political developments. They also have a common history in the past, especially in the 19th century belonging to the Tsarist Empire, then to the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the five Central Asian Soviet socialist republics gained independence, becoming the sovereign and independent countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Map of Central Asia

Source: UN. Geospatial Information Section

Central Asia can sometimes be known as Turkestan because of the Turkish presence in the region. Turkey's people did not come from the Middle East; they came from northern Asia. On their approach to the Middle East, they stormed across Central Asia and ruled the region. The Turkish language and culture have had the greatest influence on the people of Central Asia. Turkmenistan’s name is another reminder of the Turkish connection; it means “the land of the Turkmen.” [8]. Central Asia has resurfaced as a geopolitical chessboard. Today's superpowers, the United States, Russia, China and India, have a lot riding on Central Asia. China is involved in the region in order to access the massive amounts of natural gas. Russia is boosting commerce with various Central Asian countries for military and geopolitical reasons. The United States aspires to promote democracy and stability to Central Asia in order to keep the region from becoming a breeding ground for terrorists. And India brings the connectivity strategies to these countries in this region under non-violence. Besides, Central Asia is located in a crossroads for the world's major trade routes and civilizations. This is the reason that Central Asia is becoming a fertile region for all major countries including China and India because this region plays an important role in geopolitics and is rich in resources.

Because it is located in the center of the Eurasian continent, therefore, geographer [9] observed, “he who controls the heartland controls the world”. This region is located in Mackinder's Heartland and encompassed the internal spaces of the World Island to the oceans by Spykman's Rimland, has long been a matter of strategic thinking and geopolitical planning by numerous theorists and policymakers. Most geopolitical conceptions to this region have viewed it as a battlefield for hegemonic rivalry, with domination essential for projecting influence and controlling Eurasia. Despite its importance, there was a widespread and widely held notion of Central Asia as a breeding ground for instability and civil, religious, or ethnic war. These internal destabilizing variables would jeopardize the region's status as a significant geopolitical pivot with its own will and ability to move within Eurasian dynamics and power games (Figure 2).

Foreign-policy specialists have begun to see what they call the "New Great Game" in Central Asia [11], which is characterized by heated rivalry among several powers all attempting  to  enhance  their  influence,  hegemony,   and strength in the region. Russia, the United States, the European Union, China, Turkey, Iran, and India are essential players in this 'game.'

Figure 2: The Heartland and the Rimland

Source: [10] - The Geography of the Peace

Central Asia in the Balance of Power Between China and India

China's Rise in Central Asia

Increasing influence in Central Asia, the region is said to be China's most important gas basin, where more than 3,000km of border is adjacent to Xinjiang and where President Xi Jinping announced the initiative " Belt and Road" in 2013, has long been China's consistent policy.

The China's Belt and Road Initiative was announced in 2013 by China`s president Xi Jinping, an ambitious infrastructure project that will connect East Asia and Europe. The Initiative combines both Mackinder and Spykman's geopolitical approaches to create land corridors that span all the way across the Heartland and marine routes that transit all countries belongs to the Rimland. China is located between these geostrategic sites, aspires to rule the world-island, at least economically. China is improving the interconnection of landlocked Central Asia through this geoeconomics project by constructing highways and trains to connect the Xinjiang autonomous region with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Access to natural resources and ports from the Indian Ocean, which is now closed owing to the multiple straits separating it from the South China Sea, might be assured in this manner. This economic endeavor will empower Central Asia approach to the sea, allowing it to participate in international markets and trade routes [12].

This Sino-Eurasian approach places Central Asia at the center of geopolitics and geoeconomics in the Heartland. This natural resource-rich area serves as both a producer and a transit network, connecting Eurasia's richest and most industrious western and eastern extremes. While this does not transform Central Asia into a geostrategic actor, it does strengthen China's position and China as a self-controlled-status-quo-driven hegemon in the region.

For India: Making Partnerships by Connect Central Asia’s Policy

Central Asia, with its natural resources and unique geographical location, has always been a crucial territory for great powers to exploit. Five Central Asian countries are also given special consideration by India. India sees economic and commercial opportunities in addition to political and security benefits. In particular, India is interested in Central Asia as an alternate source of energy, as a vital transportation route, and as a large market for Indian commodities. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, New Delhi made significant strides in its relations with Central Asia. India and Russia reached an agreement enabling India to utilize Tajikistan's airfield and station its air force units there in order to participate in the joint fight against terrorism.

In fact, India has close historical and cultural ties to Central Asia. The reciprocity of rich cultural heritage has laid the foundation for diplomatic coherence in modern times. Notably, bilateral diplomatic relations have developed strongly recently. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to five Central Asian countries in 2015 and New Delhi's official membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017 paved the way for strategic cooperation. Between New Delhi and Central Asian countries (4 Central Asian countries including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are also SCO members). In addition, the India-Central Asia dialogue mechanism has helped New Delhi reach out to the region. In addition, this dialogue also aims to establish cooperation among national organizations in the fields of finance, renewable energy, information, digital, green energy, and other advanced technologies.

Central Asia is located in close proximity of Afghanistan, which has emerged as a prominent actor in Central Asia. India's participation in Central Asia is projected to grow even more in the future years since the region has the ability to undermine its security, and the influence of any nation in the region may be damaging to India's security at its Western Border if this region is under China's control. The New Great Game had a significant impact on India's relationship with Central Asia. Recognizing its shortcomings, it established several official frameworks, including "Extended Neighborhood," "Immediate and Strategic Neighborhood," and the "Look North Policy" as well as the most recent "Connect Central Asia," to carve out a presence in the region. Over the last few years, India has increased its footprint in all Central Asian countries. The trend will gain traction if private firms enter the region and the Chabahar port is fully operating. Then, India will play a much greater role in the region, competing with other countries, particularly China.

Most Significant China's and India’s Activities and Influence in Central Asia

China as a Self-Controlled-Status-Quo-Driven Hegemon

According to the [13], the corridor begins in China's Xinjiang region and travels across Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean Sea, and Arabian Peninsula. It connects five Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan with 17 countries in West Asia including Iran, Saudi Arab, and Turkey. It is a significant part of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Central and West Asia are rich in natural resources, but several constraints, particularly outdated infrastructure, and a lack of finances, impede local growth. The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor will promote economic and trade cooperation as well as the flow of capital to these areas, therefore enhancing local economic and social development.

The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor connects northern China to the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Mediterranean coast via Central Asia, involving nations from Central Asia, West Asia, and North Africa. The five Central Asian nations previously played a significant role as the backbone of the old Silk Road [14].

During his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced an unclear geoeconomics and geostrategic concept known as "One Belt, One Road." This worldwide infrastructure development project was eventually dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative, which serves as a catch-all for the notions of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Belt and Road Initiative aimed to improve member nations' economic integration by establishing more modern transportation links. It also seeks to integrate money, policy, and infrastructure. Kazakhstan, whose energy, and transportation infrastructure China had previously invested in prior to the BRI because it has a critical geostrategic position in the area. Kazakhstan has substantial energy reserves in addition to its huge landmass in Eurasia, which makes it a cornerstone for transport and commerce ties on the continent. Furthermore, it has the region's strongest economy. As a result, "China regards Kazakhstan as critical for transportation, a source of energy, and a stable neighbor to its volatile Xinjiang province" [15]. The purpose of this article is to examine the economic impact of the Belt and Road Initiative's China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor on Kazakhstan.

Moreover, China's goals in Central Asia include acquiring access to natural resources and establishing peace in the region. China is a key commercial partner for Central Asia and has the potential to become the region's main economic power. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are major exporters of natural gas to China. 

In February 2008, China began to build the West-East pipeline system in Central Asia as a basis for China to deploy the China-Central Asia gas pipeline (passing through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). This pipeline system is highly appreciated for its geopolitical and strategic significance as it plays a role in ensuring China's energy security. In order to prepare for this pipeline, China has taken concrete steps to penetrate the Central Asian market, such as signing a series of gas purchase agreements with countries with the condition that gas must be transported through the China Central Asia pipeline. Besides, China also signed agreements to build gas pipelines (transit through each country) with Turmekistan, Kazaksta and Turkenistan (Figure 3).

The China-Central Asia Natural Gas Pipeline is a network of three, soon to be four, pipelines that transport natural gas from Central Asia to China. Thus, China fully has geopolitical interests in this area, to serve its goal of global hegemony if it can control the resource geopolitics of Central Asia. And when it comes to oil, China is not competing with India, but directly competing with Russia.

Figure 3: China – Central Asia – West Asia Economic Corridor

Source: Sahakyan [16]

Russia is the world's largest gas producer and the main supplier of this energy to Europe. The country has always had to rely on Central Asia, a huge oil and gas reservoir along the Silk Road, for adequate output. Thus, the appearance of China can be the basis to help Central Asian countries have more choices for economic development and enjoy more benefits, however, the overlapping of geopolitical interests will between the major powers in this region.

According to the official statistics of each country in 2019 [17], China is the top commercial partner to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in terms of imports, and Turkmenistan's major trading partner in terms of exports. China is also a popular destination for imports and exports from other Central Asian nations. From 2015 to 2019, Central Asian exports to China increased by 35%, from $15,054 million to $20,276 million, with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan reporting the fastest growth of more than 50% (Figure 4).

During the same period, Chinese exports to Central Asian nations climbed by 49 percent, from US$17,563 million to US$26,207 million. Uzbekistan's purchases from China increased by 126 percent between 2015 and 2019, whereas products shipped from China to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan dropped. Except for Turkmenistan, China has a positive trade balance with all Central Asian nations. This is mostly due to Turkmenistan's minimal participation in the worldwide supply chain and high self-sufficiency rate in basic daily requirements, energy, and food - Turkmenistan's import volume is comparatively tiny. Furthermore, Turkmenistan is rich in mineral and energy resources, which account for more than 90% of its exports [17].

China's emphasis on greater economic interconnectivity through the improvement of critical infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines, highways, railways, and telecommunications networks align with Central Asia's energy-rich states' long-held desire to diversify export routes for their oil and gas, as well as their need for infrastructure investment [18]. However, the dilemma for Central Asia is that it may swap structural dependence on Russia for that of China [19]. This is particularly true for weaker states like Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The dependence of Turkmenistan on China, for example, has two aspects. As a consequence of a series of pipeline conflicts with important neighbors and Russia since the late 2000s, China has emerged as the country's only trustworthy  customer, according  to a  thirty-year agreement inked between Ashgabat and China National Petroleum Corporation. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [20], in recent years, Beijing has shifted from large-scale infrastructure projects to helping Central Asian economies, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan industrialize. China has also used soft power to strengthen its diplomacy in Central Asia. The Confucius Institutes are particularly popular among young people since learning Chinese boosts career possibilities in Chinese-affiliated firms. Furthermore, Beijing offers thousands of scholarships to Central Asian students. WeChat and other Chinese social networks are highly popular, with Central Asian businesses utilizing them to network with their Chinese counterparts.

In fact, China will remain a major economic presence in the region, and Central Asia also has an important strategic position, having been a place of competition for influence between major powers, especially the US, Russia and China, now with the presence of India. China will approach these countries in the region by financial assistance and infrastructure investment to gain trust and increase influence to implement national strategies.

Figure 4: Trade in Goods 

Source: UN Comtrade Database

India with Connectivity Projects

The ‘constructivist’ approach is a theory significant role in the Indian Government's foreign policy in the past two decades in India [21]. based on this theory, India' connect policy which is a broad-based approach to all fields such as political, security, economic, and cultural connections for building mutual understanding to target India's goals in this region.

To compete with China’s initiative, India has started its own attempts to develop economically viable alternatives to BRI that strategically balance China's expanding area of influence. India has successfully transitioned from a "Look East" strategy to an "Act East" one. Strong connections with Vietnam, the implementation of the Trilateral Highway project, the projected Mekong-Ganga Economic Corridor, the reinforcement of BIMSTEC (The Initiative is a regional organization comprising seven Member States lying in the littoral and adjacent areas of the Bay of Bengal. It has also provided a platform for intra-regional cooperation among SAARC and ASEAN countries.), and the development of marine links with Indonesia and Singapore are all steps in this direction. In line with its 'Go West' strategy, India is attempting to become a participant in the International North South Transport Corridor, which would provide access to Central Asia. India's interest in developing Iran's important Chabahar port is seen as a threat to Gwadar (the port development project between Pakistan and China, located at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, becoming an important part of the ancient "silk road" connecting China with Europe and Africa) (In the author’s viewpoint, from a commercial standpoint, the two initiatives have distinct goals: Gwadar intends to improve China's access to the Indian Ocean; Chabahar will allow Indian imports and exports to and from Central Asian markets, as well as providing an opportunity for New Delhi to participate in Afghan reconstruction.). Furthermore, India and Japan are collaborating on the “Asia Africa Growth Corridor” to control China’s influence in this region and prevent the development of a Chinese military base in Pakistan. 

India's primary regional aims were articulated in the country's 2012 "Connect Central Asia" strategic plan, but Indian efforts to engage in the region have become more urgent in recent years as China's economic influence in the region has expanded. As part of its national energy security strategy, India desires access to Central Asia's uranium, natural gas, oil, and coal supplies. In addition, India aspires to be a regional economic force in Central Asia, limiting Pakistan's influence and competing more effectively with China's influence in the region. India cooperated with regional partners to establish the India-Central Asia Business Council, which held its initial meeting in February 2020 and organized the first India-Central Asia Summit on 27 January 2022 in virtual format, to strengthen ties between Indian business organizations and regional chambers of commerce. The parties are also forming an India-Central Asia Development Group, through which the India has extended a one-billion-dollar line of credit for infrastructure development projects in 2020 and has provided more training slots and scholarships, including customized training programs to Central Asian countries. Such trade and investment are expected to be facilitated by three major infrastructure initiatives in which India has actively participated, including the establishment of the International North-South Transport Corridor with Iran and Russia, collaboration with Iran and Afghanistan to develop the southern Iranian port of Chabahar on the Arabian Sea, and signing the Ashgabat Agreement to facilitate trade and investment between Central Asian and Persian Gulf countries (Figure 5).

One of three major infrastructure initiatives is Chabahar Port, India is collaborating with Iran and Afghanistan to construct the southern Iranian port of Chabahar on the Arabian Sea, as well as to carry products from India to Afghanistan and Central Asia via the Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad railway. While long-standing conflicts between Pakistan and India have impeded land-based trade between India and Afghanistan and Central Asia since partition in 1947, this route allows 

Figure 5: Map of Chabahar Port

Source: Wani, A. - Observer Research Foundation [23]

Indian commodities to transit Pakistan and reach Afghanistan and Central Asia. And, because Afghanistan has historically relied on Pakistan for access to the Indian Ocean, this route now gives an alternate trade route to the Indian Ocean via Iran. In May 2016, a deal between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to connect Chabahar with the rest of the area included a contract with an Indian state-owned business, Indian Ports Global Ltd., to run Chabahar's southern port, Shahid Beheshti. India has contributed $85 million in capital and $23 million in yearly income to equip two berths at Chabahar for Phase I of the port's development [22].

Besides the Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India gas pipeline, India is interested in the optimal use of the International North-South Transport Corridor in conjunction with the Ashgabat Agreement (India has been admitted to Agreement on the Establishment of an International Transport and Transit Corridor signed on April 25, 2011, by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Sultanate of Oman, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.) to strengthen connectivity between India and Central Asian countries. With such interests and calculations, India clearly does not want to be a latecomer in this region (Table 1).

India and Central Asia have long maintained historical, cultural, political, and economic ties that have evolved into a stable, mature, and transformative alliance. As can be seen from the table, India is and will remain a key trade partner with Central Asian countries rich in energy resources such as crude oil, gas, coal, and so on. India also provides a $1 billion financing package for projects in Central Asia [24]. Because Central Asian countries are located deep within the continent, infrastructure projects in the region have difficulties in gaining access to international transportation routes. According to Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, India's trade with Kazakhstan is the most significant, with a total value of USD 1,032.81 million in 2017-2018. Uzbekistan takes second place with USD 234.39 million in the same year. However, due to the complementary aspects of Indian and Central Asian economies, the potential for trade is exceptionally great. 

While India seeks to expand its influence and role in Central Asia, it is dwarfed by the presence of other major powers, most particularly China and Russia. As a result, in way to construct a more successful engagement strategy, India will need to factor this reality into its strategic calculus. So, India's influence will grow in Central Asia based on soft power's policy based on the mutual interests. This is the useful approach of India to Central Asia to increase the influence and position in the Asia region.

Table 1: India’s Trade with Central Asian Countries, 2015- 2018 (US$ millions)

Source: Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank, Indian Government

Prospect of Central Asia between China – India Power Competition in the Third Decade of the XXI Century

Essentially, two great powers, China and India, co-emerged in Central Asia at this period as a result of geostrategic developments, with key countries developing collaboration and gathering forces in the region. However, more time is needed to assess whether this influence race can have any implications. The interests of India and China in Central Asia do not appear to be at competition, but rather parallel at times. These include collaboration to avoid terrorism, infrastructure development, strengthening transshipment activities, and energy cooperation. Of course, the partner who comes first and makes more acceptable ideas will benefit more.

Across reality, competition for influence and economic interests between India and China has emerged in South Asia, most prominently in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bangladesh. However, the most significant factor determining this race is the partner nations' strength and cooperative viewpoint. It will affect the situation in the region.

From the perspective of Central Asia, whose economic and military capacities to combat extremism and terrorism are limited, any agreement will benefit their own security interests.

While it is too early to predict the prospect of Central Asia between China – India power competition, what is certain today is that, in the short term, regional players, including Iran, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan and other countries in Central Asia, seem to be the main beneficiaries of this ongoing infrastructure competition between China and India in Central Asia in the third decade of the XXI century at least in terms of economic development. The remaining problem is the Central Asian countries; they must find for themselves the appropriate direction between the competitions of these two regional powers in order to reap the most benefits that the geopolitical factor itself has brought them today. Because Central Asia is seen as Russia's "backyard", within Russia's traditional military and political sphere of influence, the US and the West will also forge closer ties with Central Asian countries because they need balance, have more economic-trade partners and reduce pressure from neighboring powers.

With a leading geostrategic position, Central Asia this week is becoming a hotbed of competition for the influence of two big countries, China and India. However, to confirm whether this influence on race can cause any consequences, we still need more time to evaluate. The interests of India and China in Central Asia do not appear to be conflicting, even, at times, parallel. These are cooperation to prevent terrorism, establish infrastructure, strengthen transshipment activities, and cooperate on energy. Of course, the partner who comes first, making more reasonable proposals will have more advantages in Central Asia. 

China and India have influenced these countries for reasons of security, geostrategic purposes, energy needs, and economic growth. China have provided loans and invested huge infrastructure constructions in the region of BRI's projects, while India has focused on enhancing deeply India's connections with Central Asia through mutual interests. Both India and China are capable of competing; they are likely to be rivals in this region due to the presence and indirect influence of many other major nations. In the context of geopolitical flux, India needs gradually assume a leading role in the Central Asia where China currently has an upper hand by debt-trap diplomacy through BRI’s loans. 

Based on the above analysis, the author can conclude three main strategic competitions between China and India in Central Asia as follows: both countries engagement in this region due to geopolitical and geostrategic interests, two countries deployed different strategies including China’s harmonization and India’s constructivist, China wants to encircle India and prevent Indian alliances in Indo – Pacific region. Then, Central Asia is facing with security threats by geopolitical rivalry between great powers. 

Conflict of Interest

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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