Carl Von Clausewitz, the famous Prussian general and military theorist in his most notable work Von Kriege (On War) culminated the thought on ‘war’ as it being mainly a continuation ‘of political discourse’ [6]. However, defence scholars like John Keegan would differ with such an observation and would say that Clausewitz’s thoughts on war are incomplete, for the reason that the latter’s opinion lacks diverse perspectives. But while transitioning from ‘war’ to ‘Military Law’, Clausewitz’s observations become imperative and demand a closer scrutiny and appreciation because he brings in the word ‘political’ and hence State into the picture, which would help in comprehending this narrative transition from ‘war’ to ‘military law’. As discussed above, a war is an event which includes taking and sacrificing of human lives, a space where violence reigns, a theatre of bloodshed where one is made to disregard the others’ right to life, for reasons specific to the situation they are being made to fight for. For an efficacious outcome in a war, it is absolutely necessary that the unit fighting it, manifests what it takes to be the best out of all other units. It essentially means that the unit has to exhibit unity, good order, discipline and collective performance, so as to be the last unit standing and/or the one who carried out the rules, regulations and policies of their sovereign as compared to those who could not. Military law is that body of law which helps and guides in the matters maintaining of all the above variables amongst the armed forces [7]. Therefore, the product is execution and the process is the military law. This process is what is believed to be the determinant of how effective an armed force is of a country. 

While delving deeper into the corpus of military law, it is witnessed that just like any other specialisation of law, it is not a dot in time and space but a progression. Late Captain Anthony J. Devico in a lecture delivered at Naval War College of United States stated that “military law necessarily evolved in the context of development of command and staff relationship” [8]. It is pervasive, discursive and non-linear, meaning thereby that it has its footprints all over history. Hence, it is worthwhile that we trace these footprints and from a broader interdisciplinary spectacles. The exercise of understanding the metamorphosis of the philosophy of military law is what we can call military jurisprudence. The understanding of basic tenets of military law, why it was needed in the very first place, how it progressed and what lies ahead for it, everything is encompassed by this term called military jurisprudence. In this article, it will be attempted to scan military jurisprudence through two major schools of law; natural law and positive law and see how these two shape the working of military jurisprudence. Before that, it is vital that we try to decode the history and historical journey of military law. 

History of Military Law

Military law as a system of legal rules forms up a separate system of justice. This distinct legal system, which also sometimes seems as “arcane to the uninitiated”, does not look up to the nitty gritty of the civilian courts while disposing matters related to the military justice problems [9]. The reason behind this body of rules to be regarded as a distinct legal system is simple, that the deployment of military personnel in different kinds of set-up and places that may be national or international, envisages a unique disciplinary requirement which mandates a flexible and separate jurisprudence capable of being operated in times of peace and conflict. The history of this essence of being a separate legal system goes back to 1^st century CE Rome. Since the foundation of Rome, it had been structured as a military state and donning weapons (arma) on one’s body was equated to one’s pride [10]. The Roman magistrates who managed to prove their mettle on the battlegrounds, constituted ‘military imperium’ (imperium militia) which was comparatively more powerful than the ‘civil imperium’ that existed in the time of peace. The jurisdiction of these magistrates changed with the territorial boundaries, as in as soon as they left the ‘religious territorial boundaries’, which had a radius of about 15 kilometres around the city of Rome, their designation changed from “civil magistrates” to that of “military commanders”. There were various punishments which were sanctioned for military related offences, some of these were verbal warnings, redeployment in other military unit, fines or wage default, expulsion from any share that was obtained through looting, penal servitude and highest of all, the capital punishment [11]. The military law however was more formalised and coded under the rule of the Byzantine emperor, Justinian I [12]. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the source of military law encompassed the articles of war and ordinances issued by the sovereign or commander. 

The history of military law in Indian subcontinent can be traced back to 3^rd century BCE when Chanakya or also popularly known as Kautilya published his much celebrated work Arthsahastra. This text contained range of issues from strategical warfare to what constitutes an ideal army, the organizational structure of army, who shall be appointed as Chief of Defence, responsibilities of soldiers in various different cavalries etc. [13].

Military Law in medieval India was exhibited by the military organisations set up by Central Asian and Rajput tradition of warfare, which was partly accepted and partly rejected by the rulers of Delhi Sultanate [14]. After the establishment of Delhi Sultanate, a separate unit of administration called Diwan-i-Arz took over the charge of organising the whole army which comprised itself the duties related to military matters such as cavalry, elephantry, infantry corps, the military hierarchy, duties of the military officers and mode of payments made to the army.

The earliest English law on military came from Richard I in 1190 when a charter was issued for officers going to Jerusalem to join Third Crusade [15]. A complete code of British army dates back to 14^th century when the “Statutes Ordinances and Customs” were sanctioned by Richard II to his forces in 1385 while attacking France [16]. Dr. U.C. Jha observes:

“These statutes called "Articles" or "Ordinances of War" were issued under the prerogative power of the Crown. The earlier Articles were of excessive severity prescribing death or loss of limb as punishment for almost every crime. There were thousands of instances of accused native soldiers being blown from a gun on the orders of their commander. As minor punishment, an accused could be branded with hot iron for swearing. He could even be flogged in public or ordered to ride the wooden horse.” 

When the Britishers arrived in India as East Indian Company, ‘Laws and Ordinances of warre’ were passed by the Earl of Essex for better conduct of the Army of England in 1643 [17]. A significant change in military laws was noted after the revolt of 1857 as the Crown took over governance of India from the Company [18]. The 1858 Government of India Act gave clear guidelines on Principles of Justice and religious tolerance. However, the mutiny of 1857 exposed many lapses in the structure of the army and hence followed a complete change and reorganisation of this institution. After 1857, a plethora of laws were passed for the discipline of armed forces which collectively forms up the heart and soul of the military laws which we have today in our country and they are the Indian Army Act, 1950 [19] (which replaced Indian Army Act, 1911), Air Force Act, 1950 [20] (which replaced Indian Air Force Act, 1932) and The Navy Act, 1957 [21] (which replaced Indian Navy Act, 1934). 

Military Law as Positive Law

Jeremy Bentham explained the meaning of law to be an “assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived by the Sovereign in a State, concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of persons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power” [22]. According to John Austin, the main characteristics of positive law are command, duty and sanctions [23], by which he meant that every law is a command, which imposes a duty and enforced by a sanction. As per Professor Philippe Nonet, “legal positivism designates not a philosophical or legal doctrine, but the historic movement by which the power of command rises to the rank of supreme source of law, thus inaugurating the reign of positive law” [24]. Therefore, broadly speaking, positive law can be called as a law which has been laid by any ‘human’ institution such as State, sovereign, courts, legislatures, etc.

Military law being a separate or distinct branch of legal system, poses a question as to whether it can call itself a positive law? To answer this, one might have to return to the refuge of the term military jurisprudence which focuses on the philosophy of military law or its metamorphosis. Going back to our understanding of history of military laws, it becomes undisputed that right from the beginning, the laws governing the functioning of military and military personnel have come from ‘volition conceived by Sovereign’. In the context created by the words of John Austin, it can then be safely said that military law is the ‘command’ of the Soveriegn/State/Commanding officer. Austin, who himself served in the army for four years during the Napoleonic wars, can be said to have inadvertently given this essential feature of military law being a positive law. Because military, being a human made institution and an extension of the State’s arm and war being a ‘continuation of the political discourse’ as Clausewitz said, the laws governing this institution has come from the authorities controlling it. It becomes politically necessary for the authorities to appropriate military and its laws so that former can meet their ends through their policies and ideologies. Moreover, one has to understand that military is an organization which does not run on the parameters of the Grundnorm based on the individual rights based approach. Therefore, to give effect to all these specificities of military, the State casts them in stone and makes up a law, which takes shape to be known as military law. To look at the Indian context, the military jurisprudence of our country takes its validity from Article 33 of the Indian Constitution. Hence it will be a little safe to say that military law is a positive law. 

Natural law in Military Law?

To consider William Blackstone’s explanation of natural law as being “co-existent with mankind and emanating from God Himself, is superior to all other laws” [25] would be an incomplete and problematic approach, however, the “co-existent with mankind” part still offers a head start to the understanding of this school of thought. Natural law theory has evolved from the echelons of ancient period philosophers like Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle who saw natural physical law as a didactic force, to Medieval Period ecclesiastical missionaries like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas who looked up to the divine power as the source of natural law, to the renaissance thinkers like Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant and Jean Rousseau, who retreated to the notion of ‘reason’ as the foundation of law [26]. After a brief setback due to 19^th century positivism, Natural law theory is on its feet again in the 20^th century with a new makeover as it can be found in the development of human rights jurisprudence post the Second World War. 

Natural law symbolizes humanistic virtues like justice, reason, morality and ethics which sets up the platform for legal philosophy and ethical or philosophical jurisprudence. It draws a sharp contrast to positive law, as the natural law does not emanate from any legislation or from any formal code. Montesquieu called natural law as confusing, vague and contrary to empirical and observable realities [27]. August Comte, the French philosopher denounced this law on the grounds of it being non-scientific, false and based on super natural beliefs [28]. Jeremy Bentham called Blackstonian understanding of natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts” [29]. John Austin also critiqued the natural law theory as being ‘misleading and ambiguous’, as mere expression of ‘positive morality’ and not to forget as “laws ‘improperly’ so called” [30].

The object of this work however is not to resolve and conclude which of these theories takes the top spot in legal jurisprudence. The paramount question that needs to be answered here is, with military law being a positive law and a separate system of law which demands autonomy and absolutely no interference from outside its institution, can it accommodate natural law which is antithetical to its radical foundation? To deconstruct this question further, a reference to the observations of Dennis McGurk, Dave I. Cotting, Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler is helpful. These scholars shed light on the ‘military indoctrination’ that a new recruit goes through while joining the service [31]. It is explained that military indoctrination is “a process by which civilians are transformed into military service members”. It is a procedure through which the individuality of the recruit is shed so that it can be easy for them to be a part of the ‘group’. From the process of “depluralization” which comprises of removing all the group associations from the newly recruit’s ‘self’ concept, to “de-individualization” of the recruit, to again “pluralization” into the military institution is the process that soldiers need to pass through. An interesting and ironical example that would explain this process would be to go through the literal dictionary meaning of the word ‘unit’, which would be “an individual thing or person regarded as single and complete but which can also form an individual component of a larger or more complex whole [32].” But when the same word is used in the military vocabulary, the meaning of it transforms itself into a less individualised concept, for instance, a military ‘unit’ would mean a small unit of ten to eleven soldiers [33]. 

Going back and filtering the question again, can an institution which is embarked upon the process of “de-individualisation” accommodate a school of thought whose one of the basic premises is ‘individualism’?

To answer this, again a visit needs to be paid to the historical evolution of military jurisprudence. From a national and an international perspective, it has been witnessed that military law, its proceedings and court Martials have incorporated principles of natural justice in the practice. For example, the court Martials have been more about military justice than command discipline [34]. There has been an increase in the number of women and other genders recruited in the military around the world [35]. Appeals in civil courts/tribunals are now allowed against court Martials, which is by large a sign that civilian legal jurisprudence is rapidly blending with military jurisprudence. Democratic states like Australia [36], Belgium [37], Denmark [38], South Africa [39], United Kingdom [40], United States [41] and Nepal [42] have laid out some civil liberties to the military personnel with some reasonable restrictions. 

It can be therefore stated military law being a positive law, have been incorporating the principles of natural law with the rise of a more rights based society.

Military Jurisprudence in India

The structure of military laws in India primarily derive its model from Article 33 of the Indian Constitution which says:

“Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces, etc.-Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to,- 

(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or 

(b) the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order; or 

(c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation established by the State for purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence; or 

(d) person employed in, or in connection with, the telecommunication systems set up for the purposes of any Force, bureau or organisation referred to in clauses (a) to (c), be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them” [43].

The Army Act, 1950, The Air Force Act and The Navy Act were enacted with keeping Article 33 of the Constitution in mind. The reservation envisaged under Article 33 was accepted in a meeting by the Sub-committee on Fundamental Rights on 30^th March, 1947 and no discussions were made. Further, this provision, again without any discussions, was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 9^th December, 1948. So the Grundnorm for the fundamental rights of our armed forces was sanctioned with little or no deliberations. The above three Acts that were enacted by the Parliament were a productive of ‘colonial continuity’ as they majorly carried with themselves the military jurisprudence of the departing Britishers. Countries like Australia, US, Canada and South Africa too carried the burden of this ‘colonial continuity’ from the British Articles of War, but surprisingly the military justice systems of these countries have undergone significant changes in the last 15-20 years as the necessary catalyst has been facilitated by the international discourse on human rights [44]. It also very important to note that military justice system of Britain itself has gone through substantial changes in the past 15 years after they have opted for a consolidated system of court martials of all the three wings of the military under tri-service Armed Forces Act, 2006.

The military jurisprudence in India, therefore can be said to be bypassing the natural law principles since the inception of the Constitution as it followed a debatable justification of non-interference with the military’s functions, as it is an institution of distinct character. But this justification is not solely adopted by India, this vision has been advocated by various jurisdictions around the world who believed and still believe that military law shouldn’t be dealt or mixed with non-military institutions. Professor Edward F. Sherman explained through few of the most common theoretical justifications that are given for a separate system of military justice are that civil courts are not equipped to respond to the needs of the military service, also that civil courts are meant to deal with civilian matters and they would not be able to adequately enforce the military matters and that the traditional view of military justice had been partly disciplinary and partly judiciary and hence court martial needs to be exclusive of military personnel as it necessarily imparts command discipline which is crucial for smooth functioning of the institution. 

Again, this however doesn’t mean that the Indian military law hasn’t witnessed its share of glimpses of natural law principles in its military jurisprudence. Although much of the ushering has been done by the judiciary than the legislature. To take a couple of examples which completely changed the outlook of military law in India, it becomes all too important to look back on the judgement given by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India [45], where in the Apex Court stressed on the ‘glaring lacuna’ that exists in the governance of Armed Forces with respect to absence of appeal regarding power to review evidence and adequacy or conclusion of the punishment that is given under the military law [46]. The Court took sharp notice of the ‘command influence’ and presence of its varying degrees in the process of court martial as their nature was observed to be as typically ‘ad-hoc’ as the bodies appointed in it were essentially the prerogative of military officers and their appointed subordinates. This perhaps prompted the Estimates Committee of the Parliament to mull over the regret noted by the Apex Court in Prithi Pal Singh Bedi case and a 19^th report was presented on 20^th August, 1992 in Lok Sabha which nudged the Government to form a Tribunal or an independent statutory board for the servicepersons of our country [47]. These developments seldom showed any positive results and the Supreme Court again in the case of Major Charanjit Singh Gill v. Union of India [48] noted that the law relating to the military still remains static and there is a pressing need for a change in it keeping in mind the observations made by the Court in Prithi Pal Singh Bedi case, the mandate of the Constitution and the changes that has been happening around the world in military jurisprudence. Around the same time, Law Commission in its 169^th report opined that a forum for appeal is urgently needed against the orders adjudicated by the courts martial [49]. Another recommendation followed on the lines of what was observed by the Apex Court in Prithi Pal judgement, by 17^th report of the Standing Committee of Defence in 2002 that “a special court of appeal on the lines of countries like France, Germany, Russia, Sweden and United Kingdom be constituted for redressal of the service personnel, where aggrieved personnel may appeal against the judgement of the military court.” Finally on 6^th December, 2007, The Armed Forces Tribunal Bill, 2005 was passed in the Parliament.

Another example of the saga of incorporating natural law principles in the military law by the Indian judiciary is the case of granting Permanent Commission to women army officers. The writ petitions for the same were instituted in the year 2003 in Delhi High Court. The discourse on making women eligible as officers in the army though started in the year 1992, but the promotions and induction in the permanent commission was not at par with the male counterparts of the army. In 2010, the High Court passed a judgement allowing Permanent Commission to women in Army and Air Force which will be at par with male officers with consequential benefits of promotion and other financial benefits [50]. After almost 8 years of beating around the bush, the Union of India filed an appeal in the Apex Court against the judgement of the High Court. Submissions by the Union of India in the appeal are worthy to be inspected as they divulge about the kind of military law that is desired and practiced by the policy makers of our country. Submissions included anxiety over “occupational hazards” like “inherent risks” involved in posting women soldiers in combat zones [51]. That it will be inconvenient for the Army to cater “spouse postings” and “long absence on account of maternity leave, child care leave” will affect “legitimate dues of male officers”, ultimately leaving them compromised. Emphasizing on the fact, the Union of India submitted that the relief has been granted to the applicants of the 2003 petition filed in High Court and an umbrella relief to women who are not part of the service would “open floodgates for litigation creating serious administrative issues of cadre management”. Apart from these stimulating submissions, the Union of India also brought to the fore some issues like “prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood and domestic obligations towards their children and families”, a “need to be in prime physical condition” as there exist “inherent physiological differences”, an “all-male environment in a unit”, infrastructure around border areas being very basic with “minimal facilities for habitat and hygiene” etc. These range of diverse issues compels us to comprehend the structure of military and military law one envisions. Apart from a retrograde perception, these submissions behove us to think as to whether the military law demands itself to be of a patriarchal nature, because these submissions from the learned counsel for Union of India, Mr. R. Balasubramanian were supposedly based on “two facets”, namely “the need to protect national security and operational effectiveness” and “non-linear battlefield scenarios in future wars”. These two facets through which the learned counsel for the Union attempted to measure the effectiveness of women’s entry in the permanent commission, can also be said to be two of the fundamental yardsticks for evaluating or assessing the variables suitable for military law and clearly, permanent commissions for women are an impediment according to the appellants. Another observation that comes up here is the response of the appellants in this case reveals both the nature of positive law and positive law nature of military law. Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 terms females as “ineligible” for enrolment or employment in the Army, this section apparently “fortifies” the appellants’ take on their inability to accept women in the permanent commission. What ‘is’ there in the statute books matters and what it ‘ought to be’ should not matter. The statute books make up the military law of the country and that should be respected. Sadly for the Union, the Apex Court dismissed the appeal and again it was the judiciary which remained the harbinger of natural law into the domain of military law. 

Like said earlier, the aim is not to find the suitable school of law out of the two to be crowned as numero uno. The intention is to feel the pulse of these two and see the amount of life they provide to the body and sustenance of military law. To conclude which of them prevails would be a travesty of the whole exercise. The narrative should never takes shape of ‘positive law vs. natural law: which is best for military jurisprudence?’ Perhaps that can wait. But all in all it has been undoubtedly noted that a single size doesn’t fit all and hence we have witnessed the synthesis of different schools of law in the polity and governance at national as well as international level. The military law scholarship needs more attraction and there has been ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ attitude towards it. 

The shift from a more closed institution to a more liberalised one has been noted when it comes to military jurisprudence. From being a separate and unquestionable entity, the post-modern era has witnessed the transition to a more liberal and accountable institution and therefore, military law has come a long way. But the question remains as to whether this ‘shift’ works best for the working of this heavily armed and highly organized force? This question might still need to be framed properly with the help of stakeholders from both civil and military arenas, before it being answered and this is specially critical in Indian scenario. It has been discussed that the ‘shift’ towards incorporating natural law has started to take place in Indian military jurisprudence, but has it been realized? What is the extent to which military law can be allowed to be a separate distinct legal system? Some events need to be highlighted before there can be made any firm opinions on that. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India [52], read down the constitutionality of section 377 of the Indian Penal Code [53] and upheld the same-sex relations between consenting adults. The draconian and colonial section which stayed in the books for over a century was stayed a hinderance for the empowerment of the LGBTQIA+ community and the Court’s verdict came as a watershed moment for their upliftment. Another landmark judgement by the Apex Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India [54], decriminalised Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code which provided punishment for the act of adultery and only penalised the paramour of the wife. The Court refused to accept the interpretation where a wife was seen as a “chattel” and “exclusive entitlement” of the husband. These two verdicts, however do not seem to be striking a chord with the ranks of Indian army as the “armed forces find huge resonance in the conservative actions of our society” [55]. With natural law aiding to bring the marginalised into the mainstream, our military law chooses to go the other way. This approach needs a critical scrutiny as 175 countries around the world allow homosexuals to participate in the military and India remains one of the 20 countries who do not. Another important development is the recent notification of Central Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules 2020 on 31^st May, 2021. The said amendment in the pension rules prohibits retired intelligence and security officials to publish any information related to the department they served without a prior clearance from the government [56]. The subjects of this amendment include personnel from Border Security Force, Assam Rifles, Central Reserve Police Force, Research and Analysis Wing among other departments notified under the second schedule of the Right to Information = some other answer. 

Shift or no shift, positive law or natural law, what is of paramount importance is that when it comes to military personnel, who are without a doubt a special category of citizens deserving our utmost respect and reverence, should not be treated as a second class of citizens. The limitation on their rights is imposed, so that the security and sanctity of our country is not compromised. Wing Commander (Dr.) U.C. Jha gives us a useful insight when it comes to the fundamental rights of the armed forces. He focuses on the closing words of Article 33 and explains, that when the Constitution through Article 33 allows the Parliament to “restrict” or “abrogate” the fundamental rights of the armed forces personnel, the Article gives that power to the Legislature in order “to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them”. Dr. Jha elucidates that the scope of the words “duty” and “discipline” is something that has been given in the hands of Legislature, which further delegates some power to the Executive (for making Army Rules, Navy Rules, etc.). The abridged rights should stand the test of these two words as to whether allowing a right affects the duty and discipline of the armed forces. Every natural law principle which knocks at the door of military law should ask itself, if it would hamper the discipline and duty of the soldiers of this nation. The space occupied by positive law and natural law in military jurisprudence can always be adjusted with the test of these two words of Article 33. For example, would it hurt the discipline or execution of duties by the armed forces if homosexuality is allowed and adultery is decriminalised? Questions like these will surface no matter how long they are evaded. Professor A.K. Keshot submits that any law passed by the Parliament under the provision of Article 33 would still be a “law” under Article 13(2). He says that “any excessive curtailment” of the fundamental rights of the forces can still be quashed by the courts, because an absolute immunity from any challenges of unconstitutionality, could not have been the intention of our Constitution makers [58]. Any obstinacy on the discourse of rights in the military is only going to lead to cracks in its structure. The rising pendency cases in the Armed Forces Tribunal can be a witness to that [59]. The scholarship of military sociology observes that military as an institution affects the culture of civil society but also, in turn gets affected by it [60]. With the advent of technology and a rights based society, the civil-military interactions and the questions emanating out that interactions are inevitable. Hence, a closer look and an elaborate discussion on military jurisprudence, an area which has often being side-lined, is long overdue.

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52. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.

53. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (India).

54. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1676.

55. “Adultery, homosexuality not acceptable in army, says Gen. Bipin Rawat.” The Hindu, www.thehindu.com/news/national/adultery-homosexuality-not-acceptable-in-army/article25963443.ece. Accessed 8 July 2021.

56. “Centre amends pension rules, bars security officials from publishing info after retirement.” The Indian Express, indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-amends-pension-rules-bars-security-officials-from-publishing-info-after-retirement-7340299/. Accessed 8 July 2021.

57. The Right to Information Act, 2005 (India).

58. Keshot, A.K. “Fundamental rights of Indian military personnel.” Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 51, 2009, pp. 67–78.

59. “23 of 34 posts of Armed Forces Tribunal vacant; 19,000 cases pending, MoD tells Parliament.” The Tribune, www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/23-out-of-34-posts-of-armed-forces-tribunal-vacant-19-000-cases-pending-mod-tells-parliament-223283. Accessed 8 July 2021.

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