Competition policy promotes efficient allocation and utilization of resources which in turn leads to increased competitiveness resulting in higher growth and development. Competition Policy promotes fair competition in the market which ultimately leads to consumer welfare in the end. Consumer protection policy is more diverse in nature and empowers consumers as it provides reliefs directly in the hands of the consumers. It provides for protection of consumers against unfair and restrictive trade practices apart from defects and deficiencies in goods or services respectively. The Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act are enacted and enforced by the Government under the competition and consumer policy respectively. In OECD roundtable on the Interface between competition and consumer policies, it was stated that “Now it is widely understood to have a single purpose: the enhancement of Consumer welfare. Thus, competition policy and consumer policy now speak the same language; they have a common overarching goal” [1]. However, the two policies address this goal from different perspectives. Competition policy approaches a market from the supply side; its purpose is to ensure that through competition, consumers have the widest possible range of choice of goods and services at the lowest possible prices. Consumer policy approaches markets from the demand side: to ensure that consumers are able to exercise intelligently and efficiently the choices that competition provides. Consumer policy addresses, among other things, information asymmetry as between sellers and buyers, false and misleading advertising, and contract terms that are not understandable or disproportionate. Competition policy and consumer policy reinforce one another. In markets that are effectively competitive, producers have internal incentives to further consumer policy objectives, for example, to develop a relationship for quality or to attract customers away from rivals by providing the necessary information to minimise switching costs. At the same time, when consumers are able to exercise their choices effectively, they can act as a competitive discipline upon producers [2]. Competition Policy contributes to economic growth to the ultimate benefit of the consumers, in terms of better choice, better quality and lower prices. Competition policy may serve as a complement to consumer protection policies to address market failures such as information asymmetries, lack of bargaining position, towards producers and high transaction costs [3].

Competition Commission of India and its Evolution

The Commission was established in October, 2003, but due to a legal challenge in the case of BrahmDutt v. Union of India, [4], it did not become fully operational till 2007.

The Commission during its initial years focused its efforts on advocacy initiatives. The Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the writ with an observation that if an expert body is to be created, it might be appropriate to consider the creation of two separate bodies, one with expertise for advisory and regulatory functions and the other for adjudicatory functions, along with an appellate body based on the doctrine of separation of powers recognized by [5] the Constitution of India.  The Amendment Act of 2007created two separate bodies, namely, (a) the Commission as a seven-member (one chairperson and 2-6 members) expert Body to function as a market regulator for preventing and regulating anti-competitive practices in the country and to carry on the advisory and advocacy functions in its role as a regulator; and (b) the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) as a three-member quasi-judicial body to hear and dispose of appeals against any direction issued or decision made or order passed by the Commission [6]. Further, pursuant to an amendment, with effect from 14 October 2009, all pending cases and pending investigations were transferred to COMPAT and CCI respectively from the MRTP Commission whereas the MRTP Act was repealed. The substantive provisions, namely, Anti-competitive agreements (Section 3) and Abuse of dominant position (Section 4) came into force on 20th May, 2009 [7]. The provisions relating to 'Regulation of Combinations' (sections 5 and 6) came into force on 1st June, 2011 [8].

Some Important Definitions of the Act

Various definitions have been defined under definition clause of the Act [9]. Some of the important definitions are as under: 

Agreement [10]

The Act has a wide and inclusive definition of an “agreement”. It is an arrangement/understanding or action in concert. It includes both written and oral agreements. It need not to be enforceable by law. Any communication among competitors, either in person or by telephone, letters, e-mail or through any other means even a wink or a nod can be construed as an agreement.

Enterprise [11]

“enterprise” means a person or a department of the Government, who or  which is, or has been, engaged in any activity, relating to the production, storage, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of articles or goods, or the provision of services, of any kind, or in investment, or in the business of acquiring, holding, underwriting or dealing with shares, debentures or other securities of any other body corporate, either directly or through one or more of its units or divisions or subsidiaries, whether such unit or division or subsidiary is located at the same place where the enterprise is located or at a different place or at different places, but does not include any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with atomic energy, currency, defense and space.

Consumers [12]

The Act defines “consumers” as any person who purchase goods either for personal use or for resale or for any commercial purpose. It also includes those consumers who hires or avails any service either for personal or commercial purpose.

Goods [13]

Goods means goods as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (8 of 1930) and includes:

• Products manufactured, processed or mined

• Debentures, stocks and shares after allotment

• In relation to goods supplied, distributed or controlled in India, goods imported into India

Person [14]

Person includes:

• An individual

• A Hindu undivided family

• A company

• A firm

• An association of persons or a body of individuals, whether

• Incorporated or not, in India or outside India

• Any corporation established by or under any Central, State or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of  the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)

• Anybody corporate incorporated by or under the laws of a country outside India

• A co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies

• A local authority

• Every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses

Practice [15]

Includes any practice relating to the carrying on of any trade by a person or an enterprise.

Service [16]

Service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of services in connection with business of any industrial or commercial matters such as banking, communication, education, financing, insurance, chit funds, real estate, transport, storage, material treatment, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, boarding, lodging, entertainment, amusement, construction, repair, conveying of news or information and advertising.

Salient Features of Competition Act, 2002

The Competition Act provides for establishment of a Competition Commission of India which will be a quasi-judicial body bound by principles of rule of law (i.e. predictability in reasoning and uniform and consistent application of law) in giving decisions and the doctrine of precedents. The CCI has all the powers of a civil court for gathering evidence.

There are three major elements in the Competition Act:

• Anti-competitive Agreements [17] 

• Abuse of Dominant Position [18]

• Regulation of Combinations [19]

• Competition Advocacy and Reference [20] 

Anti-Competitive Agreements

Anti-competitive Agreements are prohibited under the Competition Act. Section 3 of the Competition Act states that any agreement which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (hereinafter referred to be AAEC) in India is deemed anti-competitive. Section 3 (1) of the Competition Act prohibits any agreement with respect to “production, supply, distribution, storage, and acquisition or control of goods or services which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India”.

The Competition Act does not define AAEC but the Section 19 (3) [21] of the Act specifies certain factors for determining AAEC [22]. The intent of the legislature reflected vide the mandatory language of Section 19 (1) of the Act is that the CCI is required to carry a balanced assessment of anti-competitive effect as well pro-competitive justification of the agreement. As stated above AAE is not defined but Section 19 (3) provides the following factors that the CCI must have due regard to which determining whether an agreement has an AAEC under Section 3:

• Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market

• Driving existing competitors out of the market

• Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market

• Accrual of benefits to consumers

• Improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services;

• Promotion  of technical,  scientific  and economic  development  by means  of  production or  distribution of goods or provision of services

The Act, which prohibits anti-competitive agreements, has a laudable purpose behind it. It is to ensure that there is a healthy competition in the market, as it brings about various benefits for the public at large as well as economy of the nation. In fact, the ultimate goal of competition policy (or for that matter, even the consumer policies) is to enhance consumer well-being. These policies are directed at ensuring that markets function effectively. Competition policy towards the supply side of the market aims to ensure that consumers have adequate and affordable choices [23].

Remedies Available against Anti-Competitive Agreements

Section 27: Competition Commission of India has the following powers in this regard:

• Passing an interim order during the pendency of inquiry

• Serve a cease and desist notice directing the offending parties to a cartel to discontinue and not to repeat such agreements in future [24]

• Order the offending parties to modify the agreement

• Impose on each member of the cartel a hefty pecuniary penalty [25]

Abuse of Dominant Position

Dominance is not considered bad per se but its abuse is. Abuse is stated to occur when a enterprise or a group of enterprises uses its dominant position in the relevant market in an exclusionary or/and an exploitative manner.

The Act defines dominant position (dominance) in terms of a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market in India, which enables it to: Operate independently of the competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market [26]; or an affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favor [27]. 

Factors that Determine Dominant Position

Section 19(4) of the act mentions the factors that help in determining dominant position in the market. Dominance has been traditionally defined in terms of market share of the enterprise or group of enterprises concerned. However, a number of other factors play a role in determining the influence of an enterprise or a group of enterprises in the market. These include [28]:

• Market share of the enterprise

• Size and resources of the enterprise

• Size and importance of the competitors

• Economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors

• Vertical integration of the enterprises or sale or service network of such enterprises

• Dependence of consumers on the enterprise

• Monopoly or dominant position whether acquired as a result of any statute or by virtue of being a Government company or a public sector undertaking or otherwise

• Entry barriers including barriers such as regulatory barriers, financial risk, high capital cost of entry, marketing entry barriers, technical entry barriers, economies of scale, high cost of substitutable goods or service for consumers

• Countervailing buying power

• Market structure and size of market

• Social obligations and social costs

• Relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by the enterprise enjoying a dominant position having or likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition

• Any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant for the inquiry.

In Dhanraj Pillay and Ors v Hockey India [29] the CCI held that the Act was not violated where allegedly abusive contractual restrictions were not disproportionate to a sporting organisation’s legitimate regulatory goals.

The terms of the Fuel Supply Agreement of non-coking coal were found to be discriminatory towards public sector power generators as well as old power generating companies. The court rightly held these terms to be in violation of s. 4 (2) (a) (i) because such conduct would have a serious cascading effect on the entire economy and would impact the consumers ultimately [30].

Faridabad Industries Association (FIA) v M/s Adani Gas Limited (AGL) [31] (Adani Gas case), The Commission held that, various criteria such as consumer preferences, end usage of goods, price of goods or service, product classification, physical characteristics, excluding the in-house manufactured goods, must be taken into consideration in order to determine the Relevant Market for the products under Section 2(t) of the Competition Act.

Abuses as Specified in the Act Fall into two Broad Categories:

• Exploitative (excessive or discriminatory pricing) and

• Exclusionary (for example, denial of market access)

Predatory Pricing

The “predatory price” under the Act means “the sale of goods or provision of services, at a price which is below the cost, as may be determined by regulations, of production of goods or provision of services, with a view to reduce competition or eliminate the competitors [32]” Predation is exclusionary behaviour and can be indulged in only by enterprises (s) having dominant position in the concerned relevant market.

The Major Elements Involved in the Determination of Predatory Behavior are:

• Establishment of dominant position of the enterprise in the relevant market

• Pricing below cost [33] for the relevant product in the relevant market by the dominant enterprise 

• Intention to reduce competition or eliminate competitors this is traditionally known as the predatory intent test

Procedure followed by the Commission

In exercise of powers vested under Section 19 of the Act, the commission may ask into any supposed negation of Section 4(1) of the Act that states about the abuse of dominant position. Section 19(4) gives a detailed list of elements that the Commission will consider while asking into any claim of abuse of dominance. A portion of these components is the market share of the endeavor, size, and assets of the venture, size, and significance of the contenders, reliance of buyers, passage obstructions, and social commitments and expenses in the pertinent geographic and item showcase. 

The Commission, on being fulfilled that there exists an at first sight instance of abuse of dominant position, will guide the Director-General to cause an examination and outfit a report. The Commission has the forces vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to issues like summoning or authorizing the participation of any individual and examining him on the pledge, requiring revelation and creation of records and accepting proof on an affidavit. The Director-General, to complete an examination, is vested with forces of the civil court other than forces to lead ‘search and seizure’.

Powers of the Commission

After request, the Commission may pass inter-alia any or the entirety of the following orders under Section 27 of the Act:

• Direct the parties to suspend and not to reappear into such an understanding

• Direct the endeavor or enterprise concerned to alter or change the agreement

• Direct the enterprise concerned to submit to such different requests as the Commission may pass and conform to the bearings, including payment of expenses, assuming any

• Pass such different orders or issues such directions as it might esteem fit

• Can force such punishment as it might consider fit. The punishment can be up to 10% of the normal turnover for the last three preceding financial years of endless supply of such people or ventures which are parties to bid-rigging or collusive bidding

• Section 28 enables the Commission to coordinate the division of a venture or enterprise appreciating the prevailing situation to guarantee that such an undertaking doesn’t showcase an abuse of dominant position

Thus the available remedies are, when the abuse of dominant position has been built up, the competition specialists can take certain measures for the same:

• A restraining order

• The penalty which might be 10% of yearly turnover

• Direct the enterprise to make a move which the authority regards fit

• Give any other request which it might think fit

• Divide the prevailing endeavor

• In the instance of allure to the Competition Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal may arrange for payment to the party bearing misfortune

Interim Order

Under Section 33 of the Act, during the pendency of an investigation into abuse of dominant position, the Commission may incidentally control any party from duration with the alleged offending act until the completion of the order or until further order, without giving out to such gathering, where it esteems fundamental or necessary.

Appeals

The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) is set up under Section 53A of the Act, to hear and discard claims against any course given or a choice made or order passed by the Commission underdetermined or specific sections of the Act. An appeal must be documented inside 60 days of receipt of the order/direction/choice of the Commission [34].

Penalties and Sanctions

42. Contravention of Orders of Commission [35]: 

• The Commission may cause an inquiry to be made into compliance of its orders or directions made in exercise of its powers under the Act

• If any person, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with the orders or directions of the Commission issued under Sections 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 42-A and 43-A of the Act, he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh for each day during which such non-compliance occurs, subject to a maximum of rupees ten crore, as the Commission may determine

• If any person does not comply with the orders or directions issued, or fails to pay the fine imposed under sub-section (2), he shall, without prejudice to any proceeding under Section 39, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to rupees twenty-five crore, or with both, as the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi may deem fit

Provided that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi shall not take cognizance of any offence under this section save on a complaint filed by the Commission or any of its officers authorized by it.

42-A. Compensation in Case of Contravention of Orders of Commission [36]

Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act, any person may make an application to the Appellate Tribunal for an order for the recovery of compensation from any enterprise for any loss or damage shown to have been suffered, by such person as a result of the said enterprise violating directions issued by the Commission or contravening, without any reasonable ground, any decision or order of the Commission issued under Sections 27, 28, 31, 32 and 33 or any condition or restriction subject to which any approval, sanction, direction or exemption in relation to any matter has been accorded, given, made or granted under this Act or delaying in carrying out such orders or directions of the Commission.

43. Penalty for Failure to Comply with Directions of Commission and Director General [37]: If any person fails to comply, without reasonable cause, with a direction given by:

• The Commission under sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 36

• The Director General while exercising powers referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 41,such person shall be punishable with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh for each day during which such failure continues subject to a maximum of rupees one crore, as may be determined by the Commission

43-A. Power to Impose Penalty for Non-Furnishing of Information on Combinations [38]

If any person or enterprise who fails to give notice to the Commission under sub-section (2) of Section 6, the Commission shall impose on such person or enterprise a penalty which may extend to one per cent of the total turnover or the assets, whichever is higher, of such a combination?

44. Penalty for Making False Statement or Omission to Furnish Material Information

If any person, being a party to a combination:

• Makes a statement which is false in any material particular, or knowing it to be false

• Omits to state any material particular knowing it to be material, such person shall be liable to a penalty which shall not be less than rupees fifty lakhs but which may extend to rupees one crore, as may be determined by the Commission

45. Penalty for offences in relation to furnishing of information [39]

About (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 44, if a person, who furnishes or is required to furnish under this Act any particulars, documents or any information:

• Makes any statement or furnishes any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be false in any material particular

• Omits to state any material fact knowing it to be material

• Willfully alters, suppresses or destroys any document which is required to be furnished as aforesaid, such person shall be punishable with fine which may extend to rupees one crore as may be determined by the Commission

About (2) without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the Commission may also pass such other order as it deems fit.

46. Power to Impose Lesser Penalty

The Commission may, if it is satisfied that any producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in any cartel, which is alleged to have violated section 3, has made a full and true disclosure in respect of the alleged violations and such disclosure is vital, impose upon such producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider a lesser penalty as it may deem fit, than leviable under this Act or the rules or the regulations [40]: [Provided that lesser penalty shall not be imposed by the Commission in cases where the report of investigation directed under Section 26 has been received before making of such disclosure]. Provided further that lesser penalty shall be imposed by the Commission only in respect of a producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in the cartel, who [41] [has] made the full, true and vital disclosures under this section [42]: [Provided also that lesser penalty shall not be imposed by the Commission if the person making the disclosure does not continue to cooperate with the Commission till the completion of the proceedings before the Commission].

Provided also that the Commission may, if it is satisfied that such producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in the cartel had in the course of proceedings:

• Not complied with the condition on which the lesser penalty was imposed by the Commission 

• Had given false evidence

• The disclosure made is not vital and thereupon such producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider may be tried for the offence with respect to which the lesser penalty was imposed and shall also be liable to the imposition of penalty to which such person have been liable, had lesser penalty not been imposed

47. Crediting Sums Realised by Way of Penalties to Consolidated Fund of India

All sums realised by way of penalties under this Act shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. 48. Contravention by companies (1) where a person committing contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, regulation, order made or direction issued thereunder is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such contravention.

About (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, or of any rule, regulation, order made or direction issued thereunder has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly

Explanation

For the purposes of this section:

• “Company” means a body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals

• “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm

In one of the cases COMPAT held that punishments are to be determined based on the ‘significant turnover’.  So, for a situation of maltreatment against a multi-item organization, the turnover used to compute the punishment would be the turnover from the specific product (s) in conflict and not the general turnover [43]. Similarly in another case [44] COMPAT didn’t confine the figuring of the punishment based on DLF Limited’s turnover emerging just from the private fragment, in spite of the significant market all things considered being the market for ‘very good quality private settlement’. COMPAT maintained the punishment demanded by the CCI, which was determined based on DLF’s turnover relating to its whole business (i.e., the advancement of private, office and business properties.

Competition cases are typically fewer in number and broader in scope, affecting entire markets. Consumer cases are more numerous and more narrowly focused, sometimes involving a specific practice by a single business. Competition and consumer agencies also have different tools at their disposal for dealing with violations of their respective laws. Co-ordinating the two policies has obvious benefits, even at the level of a single case. Because they use different approaches, employing different tools, applying them together adds flexibility, especially in cases where market problems can be analyzed before choosing which tools to deploy. The prime focus ought to be the market and what can make it work better. An equally important reason for co-ordination is to ensure that the application of one does not interfere with the other. The imposition of anticompetitive restrictions on behavior-unnecessary restrictions on price advertising, for example-will harm competition and consumers. Thus it can be concluded that the competition act provides a regulatory frame work at the market level to curb the anti-competitive practices which are detrimental to the consumer interests. However, it is not the only area where the consumers need protection of their rights. The overall functioning of the competition commission and the appellate body is satisfactory but the common man, a consumer must be made aware about the law relating to competition and the remedies available therein. It is the first and foremost duty of the state to make the policy and a viable mechanism regarding the awareness of the people about the rights and their enforcement.

1. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/34/40898016.pdf  visited on 03.04.2021. 

2. Ibid 

3. ASEAN Regional guidelines on Competition Policy, Objectives and benefits of Competition Policy, www.asean.org/images/2012/publications/competition/policy.pdf

4. (2005) (2) SCC 431.

5. BrahmDutt v. Union of India, (2005) (2) SCC 431. para 6.

6. Competition (Amendment) Act 2009, 39 of 2009

7. Central Government notification S.O 1241 (E) and S.O 1242 (E) dated May 15, 2009.

8. Central Government notification S.O. 479(E) dated 4th March, 2011.

9. Section 2 of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

10. Section 2(b) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

11. Section 2(h) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

12. Section 2(f) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003. consumer” means any person who— (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, whether such purchase of goods is for resale or for any commercial purpose or for personal use; (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first-mentioned person whether such hiring or availing of services is for any commercial purpose or for personal use;

13. Section 2(i) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

14. Section 2(l) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

15. Section 2(m) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

16. Section 2(u) of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

17. Section 3 of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

18. Section 4 of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

19. Sections 5-6 of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

20. Sections 49 &21 of The Competition Act, 2002. No. 12 OF 2003.

21. Automobiles Dealers Association v. Global Automobiles Limited & Anr., CCI Case No 33 of 2011, decided on July 3, 2012;  CCI held that it would be prudent to examine an action in the backdrop of all the factors mentioned in Section 19(3).

22. The factors under Section 19 (3) includes six factors, first three being anti-competitive remaining three being pro-competitive factors (a) crea-tion of entry barrier (b) driving existing competitors out of market (c) foreclosure of competition (d) benefits to consumers (e) improvements in the production or distribution of goods or the provision of services, and (f) the promotion of technical, scientific and economic development.

23. Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1718.

24. The Commission initiated suo moto proceedings against LPG cylinder manufactures who were found to be involved in bid rigging in supplying LPG cylinders to M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. pursuant to a tender floated by it. It was noted by the Commission that the identical price quotations submitted by the opposite parties therein pursuant to the impugned tender were actuated by mutual understanding/ arrangements. The Commission apart from issuing a cease and desist order imposed a penalty upon each of the contravening party @ 7% of the average turnover of the company. In COMPAT's 2013 judgment, the CCI's order was upheld on its merits and CCI was directed to reconsider the penalties it had imposed on the manufacturers. . For details see: http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/LPGMainfeb2.pdf.

25. CCI imposed a Rs. 671 crore penalty on four state-run insurance companies— National Insurance, New India Assurance, Oriental Insurance and United India Insurance for cartelisation and indulging in anti-competitive practices. It was observed that the four companies colluded with each other and manipulated the tendering process initiated by the Kerala government by forming a cartel and quoting higher premium rates. For details see: http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/022014S.pdf.

26. 
     

27. (Section 2(r)) The Competition Act, 2002, Act 12 of 2002. The relevant market means “the market that may be determined by the Commission with reference to the relevant product market or the relevant geographic market or with reference to both the markets”. In the case of  Atos Worldline v Verifoneindia, Case No. 56 of 2012, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), held that the relevant product market is to be looked at from both demand and supply perspective based on the characteristics of the product, its price and intended use. Similarly, in the case of Surinder Singh Barmi v The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), Case No. 61/2010, it was held that the relevant market was settled on the thought of demand substitutability of different types of amusement or entertainment. It was held that a cricket match couldn’t be held to be substitutable by some other game dependent on neither qualities nor the intention of the person watching the cricket match.

28. Section 4(2)(a)  The Competition Act, 2002, Act 12 of 2002.

29. Section 19(4)  The Competition Act, 2002, Act 12 of 2002.

30. (Case No.73 of 2011) http: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/732011_0.pdf  retrieved on 03.02.2021.

31. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd. v. Coal India Limited, Case Nos. 03, 11 & 59 of 2012 (CCI).

32. (Case No. 71 of 2012) http: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/712012_0.pdf  retrieved on 03.02.2021.

33. [Explanation (b) of Section 4] The Competition Act, 2002, Act 12 of 2002.

34. [‘Cost’, for this purpose, has been defined in the Competition Commission of India (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2009 as notified by the Commission.]

35. Section 53 A.

36. Substituted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

37. Insterted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

38. Substituted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).. 

39. Inserted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

40. Substituted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

41. Substituted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

42. Substituted by Act 39 of 2007, S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

43. Inserted by Act 39 of 2007,   S. 34 (w.e.f. 20-5-2009).

44. M/s Excel Crop Care Limited v. Competition Commission of India, 2017 http: www.cci.gov.in. retrieved on 3.2.2021.

45. M/s DLF Limited v Competition Commission of India & Ors., 2018 http: www.cci.gov.in. retrieved on 3.2.2021.