The insurgency in north eastern Nigeria took place within the context of long-standing religious violence between Nigeria`s Muslim and Christian communities [1]. Though, Boko Haram consistently claimed it is fighting to establish Islamic state and law in Nigeria. But then, the reasons why more Muslims are attacked and killed in the conflict than people from any other religion is enough reason to argue the basis that the group is fighting for the sake of Islam. Most of the communities attacked and persons displaced in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which are the battle fronts had more Muslims than Christians. Suicide bombings that took place in most of the soft spots across Nigeria have claimed the lives of more Muslims than Christians [2]. Several Muslim Ulamas in Major towns especially in Borno and Yobe states have been attacked while few others have been killed especially in Maiduguri the Borno state capital [3]. In most of the camps if not all where Internally Displaced Persons (IDP`s) are settled, there is hardly one without Muslims. This implies that the insurgency was affiliated with Islam by Boko Haram in other to deceive ignorant young ones who were ever willing to fight and die in the name of God into joining the group and build up more combatants needed to take up arms against the Nigerian state and authority [4].

Armed rebellion against the Nigerian government started in 2009 by the Jihadist rebel group popularly known as Boko Haram, marked the beginning of insurgency in Nigeria`s north east region1. At least, 250, 000 out of 2.3 million people internally displaced by the insurgency have fled into Cameroun, Chad and Nigeria from Nigeria [5]. In 2014, over 6, 600 have been killed by Boko Haram. Mass abduction especially the kidnapped of 276 school girls from Chibok in April 2014was also carried out by Boko Haram [6]. In the same 2014, the insurgency dramatically escalated with 10, 849 deaths added to 1, 000 earlier reported death cases in 2013 [7]. In 2014, Cameroun, Chad and Niger came under attack as the insurgency spreads across Nigeria`s boundary into these neighboring countries thus, making the conflict a regional battle. Considering the number of people killed and properties destroyed by the ongoing insurgency, Boko Haram has been rated the world`s deadliest terrorist group [8]. The replacement of Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musab-al-Barnawi happened after the battle for Konduga in which the Nigerian government forces forcefully pushed Boko Haram out of Konduga to recaptured the town back. 

It was announced that Shekau had been killed as the government forces displayed the picture of an insurgent killed in the battle as the dead body of Shekau.                

Shortly afterward, Shekau bounces back in his usual way and manner of sending messages to the Nigeria Government through the internet and announced that he was not killed in the battle for Konduga and that he still remains the leader of Boko Haram. It was later confirmed by the government forces that the insurgent killed was not actually Shekau. And that Shekau is still alive [5]. Much more later again, it was rumored that Shekau has been killed in a battle with Joint Multinational Forces made up of soldiers from Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria at Amchide a border town between Nigeria and Cameroun. As usual, Shekau bounces back again announcing he was still alive and remains the leader of Boko Haram. He announced his readiness to carry out more attacks on Nigerian government forces and civic institutions.

Nigerian government`s establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the entire north-east Nigeria, led to an increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks [9]. This in turn instead of arresting the insurgency culminated in its severity than the pre-state of emergency period. The confusion and controversial conditions created under the state of emergency rule have not yet been addressed. Killings rose than before, brutality grew higher, civilians became helpless as some of the attacks on highways are done by people one cannot ascertain whether they are Insurgents of Nigerian government forces. The security scenario in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states became undefined as the demarcation between those fighting in defense of national interest and those killing in the name of God became relatively narrowed. Insurgents devised several strategies with which they countered government forces tactics to contain them. Anxiety rose ever than before, military transfer of aggression on innocent civilians grew with time and as such several citizens fled their homes in anticipation of possible aggressive military raiding. This also contribute in building up the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP`s) by the insurgency [6].

Declaration of state of emergency rule in north eastern Nigeria by the federal government of Nigeria has failed in ending the insurgency the region is suffering from. Military alleged taking over of the Sambisa forest and its establishment of camp zero there in has also not ended attacks across the region. Insurgency at initial stage may be possibly contained but once extended, fire power hardly ends it. In some cases, insurgency live longer than expectation. It does not end easily overnight and military power has not successfully crushed it to end anywhere in the world. It ends itself for natural reasons like the death of its sponsors and strategists. And in other, it melted and subdue itself into bodies of factions with several leaders fighting a common cause. And at times, it broke into groups with different lords fighting against themselves for lack of unify aim of struggling thus, reducing their engagement of government forces.

Statement of Problem

Boko Haram insurgency is one of the prevailing conflicts in Nigeria. It started as an internal conflict but soon spread across Nigeria`s international boundaries into Cameroun, Chad and Niger thus, becoming a regional conflict in nomenclature than an internal one. The conflict translated in destruction of socio-economic and political activities across the North-East Region of Nigeria with Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States been the most affected part of the region [10]. Several studies came up with time as the insurgency continues. Some of the studies among others have offered a number of policy suggestions on the effect of the conflict on the state and development of socio-economic and political activities in the region [11]. What are the effects of the insurgency on the training of student nurses and midwiferies in the region? Why have previous research suggestions failed in ameliorating the problem? And how can the problem be ameliorated? 

Little attention was given to the effect of the insurgency on the training of student nurses and midwiferies in the north east region. This may be due to the fact that in-depth investigation has not been conducted on the condition and state of Colleges of Nursing and Midwifery as the insurgency continues. And, this may also be responsible for the inability of initial research suggestions to ameliorate the effects of the insurgency on Colleges of Nursing and Midwifery in the region. Thorough knowledge of the state of Colleges of Nursing and Midwifery in the region during the pre-insurgency as well as in the insurgency eras is needed to be able to make an objective conclusion on the effects of the insurgency on the training of student nurses and midwiferies in the region. 

Previous studies have all adopted the qualitative method of inquiry on the effect of the insurgency in Nigeria`s north east region [12]. Though, none of the studies has been able to explore the effect of the insurgency on the training of student nurses and midwiferies in the region. And, primary method was not adopted in initial related studies. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are jointly needed to be able to acquire sufficient knowledge of the insurgency, its effect on the training of student nurses and midwiferies as well as policy suggestions on how it can be ameliorated. 

The fore goings justified the nature of gaps created in knowledge especially in the areas of methodology and exploring the effect of the prevailing insurgency on the training of student nurses and midwiferies in the north east region. It is the desire to bridge up the identified research gaps stated that the study was necessitated.

Research Question

The research questions are:

• What are the effects of insurgency on the training of student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

• What are the effects of the insurgency on the occupational stability of student nurse and midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

• And, what are the effects of the insurgency on the academic performances of student nurses and midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Objective of the Study

The objectives of the research are to:

• Investigate the effect of insurgency on the training of student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

•  Identify the effect of the insurgency on the occupational stability of student nurse and midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

• Find out the effect of the insurgency on the academic performances of student nurses and midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Hypothesis

The hypotheses formulated to guide the study are:

• H1: Insurgency has effect on the training of student Nurses and Midwiferies

• H2: Insurgency affects the occupational stability of student nurse and midwife Trainers

• H3: Insurgency has effect on the academic performances of student nurses and midwiferies

Literature Review

The insurgency in north eastern Nigeria took place within the context of long-standing religious violence between Nigeria`s Muslim and Christian communities [1]. Though, Boko Haram consistently claimed it is fighting to establish Islamic state and law in Nigeria. But then, the reasons why more Muslims are attacked and killed in the conflict than people from any other religion is enough reason to argue the basis that the group is fighting for the sake of Islam. Most of the communities attacked and persons displaced in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which are the battle fronts had more Muslims than Christians. Suicide bombings that took place in most of the soft spots across Nigeria have claimed the lives of more Muslims than Christians [2]. Several Muslim Ulamas in Major towns especially in Borno and Yobe states have been attacked while few others have been killed especially in Maiduguri the Borno state capital [3]. In most of the camps if not all where Internally Displaced Persons (IDP`s) are settled, there is hardly one without Muslims. This implies that the insurgency was affiliated with Islam by Boko Haram in other to deceive ignorant young ones who were ever willing to fight and die in the name of God into joining the group and build up more combatants needed to take up arms against the Nigerian state and authority [4].

Swathes territory in and around their home state of Borno estimated at 50, 000 square kilometers (20, 000sq mi) had been captured by Boko Haram in mid-2014 [13]. Boko Haram did not capture Maiduguri the Borno state capital where the group was originally based but the group hold tight to the territory it captured and control up to January 2015 [14]. But the Nigerian Armed Forces shortly revealed that Nigerian Troops Have Destroyed All Boko Haram Camps [9]. The contradicting observation in this revelation is the point that, if all Boko Haram camps have been destroyed, then conquered territories have been liberated. If conquered territories have been actually liberated then there is no need to continue accommodating Internally Displaced Persons (IDP`s) in the various camps where hardships due to shortage of amenities is the order of the day. We may accept the fact that repairs especially reconstruction of facilities damaged need to be done before IDP`s can be returned to their various communities [15]. But then, the problem is the basic question of how long or soon it is going to take the Nigerian government in doing this so that the IDP`s most of whom are already hopeless of the possibility of starting a new life all over again can be given the hope of starting a life with prospect of achieving higher level and standard than before [16].

Large portion of land in northern and central Borno state including Damboa in southern part of the state came under Boko Haram`s control in May 2013. During this period, Nigerian forces were already as part of military Joint Task Force (JTF) fighting counter-insurgency in Borno and Yobe states. This military operation includes the riot police popularly known as mobile police in the country and the department of state services carrying out intelligent service in the area. The vast land mass of the states made it difficult for JTF to patrol the whole region under insurgency therefore, military actions were more centered in larger towns including Maiduguri and around military barracks. Taking advantage of this difficulty, Boko Haram established bases and camps in areas with lighter military presence and later in the extensive savanna forest known as Sambisa extending across much areas of southern Borno and into parts of Yobe. Boko Haram was later dislodged from some of the areas in camps and bases were established to enable the group further its attacks in Mid-May 2013 as a result of reinforcement to the government forces. Some of Boko Haram`s camps were bombed from the air. And, instead of halting the escalation of the conflict, the insurgency even grew higher with several counter strategies emanating from waves of attacks perpetuated by Boko Haram [17]. Military actions as counter-insurgency measures are still ongoing in Nigeria`s north east region. Although, some information on the situation faded especially during the period in which Nigerian government declared state of emergency in the region. This declaration halted mobile phone service provision making detailed information about the insurgency and humanitarian crises emanating from it invisible to people. Mobile phone networks went off in the three states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) under emergency rule and information reaching the people were mainly from press reports in Maiduguri the Borno state capital. Statistics of people caught up by the insurgency, those relocating from affected areas and those killed by the conflict became affected and unspecific due to absence of communication network.

The growing violence by the militants of Boko Haram and the desire the put an end to such escalation led the Nigerian government into declaring a state of emergency in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe on 14th May 2013. This response to the growing violence promoted by Boko Haram due to its opposition to secular and westernizing influences culminated in critical psychological trauma in the three states affected by the emergency rule. The reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups in northern Nigeria have been challenging the established Sufi orders, the Tijjaniya and Qadiriyya since the late 1970s. This established age long challenged resulted in the emergency of Boko Haram which has broken away from the reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups. The ideology of Boko Haram chooses selectively on Salafi ideas – which are diverse but hold that Muslims should live according to the rules and modes of conduct established by the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of his followers, the ‘pious predecessors (al-salaf al-salih). Salafis emphasize the ‘restoration of Islamic doctrines to a pure form’, but the founding ideas of the Salafiyya movement in the early twentieth century also had a strong modernist streak encouraging educational reform and the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge [18]. The Boko Haram ideology, condemning secular education and any government or civil service work, deviates from Salafi doctrine. Boko Haram do use technology, including the internet and mobile phones and members of the group have acquired technical expertise to make explosives, including car bombs. It seems that as long as the knowledge helps their religious/political struggle they are willing to utilize it.

It is clear that Boko Haram fighters have been dislodged from most of their strong holds in north east Nigeria. Large unmanned areas they have established bases and camps in have also been taken over and their insurgents pushed away from those places by the government forces. Though, resurgence of pocket of attacks by the group bear features of the view that their remnants have relocated into more peripheral parts of Borno and across Nigeria`s borders into neighboring countries of Cameroun, Chad and Niger. As a result of insurgents relocating from the forested bush including Sambisa forest reserve and surrounding areas into mountainous caves, villages in Gwoza Hills which is the north east extension of the Mandara mountains stretching from north east Nigeria into Cameroun have seriously been affected by the insurgency. Several villages in Gwoza Hills and towns have been attacked with many local residents in the communities slaughtered and properties wasted by Boko Haram fighters. These have forced several residents in Gwoza Hills and town to relocate to the vicinity of northern Adamawa state but some have moved further, such as to Jos and even as Abuja in seek of refuge [13]. Meanwhile soldiers have been deployed into the Gwoza Hills and have been searching for guerrilla fighters in the caves. The military has carried out some aerial bombing and there has been a movement of refugees across the Mandara Mountains over the border from Nigeria into the far north of Cameroun. 

The northern and central areas of Borno have also seen military activity, with refugees and Boko Haram fighters moving across the border into southern Niger, especially to Diffa. Hostilities are reducing with time and attention in the north eastern region is drifting towards the effect of the insurgency on the training of student nurses which many affirmed has been negatively affected by the insurgency. The dimension taken by the training of student nurses in the region is not only sluggish but sympathetic. Decline in academic performances of student nurses as well as instability in occupational stability and serious drift of student nurse trainers from Colleges of Nursing in the region to more secure and safer regions are retarding the developmental paste of training student nurses in Nigeria`s north east region. These ugly experiences are matters demanding urgent attention from government in the country. Attention is highly needed especially on the possible modalities necessary to promote and encourage the development of training student nurses despite the ongoing insurgency in the region. Contributing towards achieving this goal necessitated the study.

The study was conducted on the College of Nursing and Midwifery at Maiduguri in Nigeria`s North East region. Qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were utilized in the research. Secondary data were sourced from the establishment department and student nurse and midwifery affairs unit of the College of Nursing and Midwifery at Maiduguri. Printed materials like newspapers, magazines, lecture notes, conference proceedings, seminars and workshop papers as well as internet-based data were used in the study. Primary data were obtained through the administration of closed ended questionnaire on 50 respondents systematically chosen among staff and students of the College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri. These respondents were represented by 20 chosen among Students` Trainers i.e. 10 student nurse Trainers and 10 student midwifery Trainers while 30 were chosen among students` comprising 15 Student Nurses and 15 Student Midwiferies. The questionnaire was administered separately at different times and days on the Trainers` and Students` in the College but the structured items (questions) for the respondents were the same. 

The frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation tools of analysis were adopted in analyzing the primary data collected for the study. The same statistical tools of analysis were also utilized in testing the hypotheses formulated to guide the study. Thus, Q: Question, F: Frequency, P: Percentage, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation. Also, SD: Strongly Agreed, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed and SA: Strongly Agreed.

Data Presentation and Analysis

The data of the study are hereby presented and analyzed. 

Table 1 shows that, only 2% of the respondents used in the study strongly disagreed that, the training of student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri has been affected negatively by the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria`s North-East region, 10% disagreed, 6% were neutral while 30% agreed and 50% strongly agreed. It is also presented by table 1 that, 44% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that, insurgency in the region has not affected the nature and quality of training giving to student Nurses and Midwiferies in the College, 36% disagreed, 4% wished to remained neutral, 10% agreed and 6% strongly agreed with the view. On the position that, statutory and sectorial allocations for training of student Nurses and Midwiferies to the College has been affected rationally as a result of the insurgency, 6% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 10% disagreed, 4% preferred to be neutral, 32% agreed and 48% strongly agreed with the position. Table 1 again shows that, 44% of them strongly disagreed that, insecurity promoted by the insurgency has not affected student Nurses and Midwiferies Trainers performances, 28% disagreed, 8% were neutral, 12% agreed while 8% strongly agreed on it. It is clearly presented in Table 1 that 4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, posting of student Nurses and Midwiferies to public hospitals outside Maiduguri for practical training has been affected by the insurgency, 8% disagreed, 10% remained neutral while 28% agreed and 50% strongly agreed. Furthermore, table 1 indicated that the average or mean score for all the Qs is 10. Q1 has the highest SD score of 77.6 while Q4 has the lowest SD score of 49.6. Q2 has 69.2 as it SD score, Q3 has SD score of 74.0 and Q5 has SD score of 73.2. The average SD score for the Qs in table 1 is 68.72.

Table 1: The Effect of Insurgency On the Training of Student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Q: Question, F: Frequency, Percentage, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

Figure 1: The Effect of Insurgency on The Training of Student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Q: Question, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed, 

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

It is clearly presented in table 2 that only 4% of the respondents used in the study strongly disagreed that, insurgency has forced several student Nurse and Midwife Trainers to shift their practice from College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri to those in safer regions outside the North-East, 8% of them disagreed, 6% wished to be neutral while 36% agreed and 46% of them strongly agreed. Presentation in table 2 also shows that, 50% of them strongly disagreed with the view that, the number of student Nurse and Midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri has not reduced even with the ongoing insurgency in the North-East region, 30% disagreed, 4% were neutral, 10% agreed and 6% strongly agreed with it. On the view that, student Nurse and Midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri carryout their jobs under severe insecurity promoted by the insurgency, 10% of them strongly disagreed, 16% disagreed, 10% remained neutral, 24% agreed and 40% strongly agreed. Table 2 also shows that, 48% of them strongly disagreed that, experienced student Nurse and Midwife Trainers from other regions of Nigeria are willing to take up job with College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri despite the insurgency the North-East region is suffering from, 32% disagreed, 4% were neutral while 10% agreed and 6% strongly agreed. It is also demonstrated in table 2 that 8% of them strongly disagreed that, special security and risk allowances ought to be given to student Nurse and Midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri, some 12% of them disagreed, 10% preferred to be neutral while 26% agreed and 44% of them strongly agreed. Furthermore, statistics show that all the Qs in table 2 recorded equal mean or average score of 10. Q2 has the highest standard deviation score of 77.6 while Q3 has the lowest i.e. 31.6. Q1 has standard deviation score of 76.4 while Q4 had 74.0 SD score and Q5 has 46.0 SD score. The general average or mean SD score for the Qs in table 2 is 61.12.

Table 2: The Effect of Insurgency On the Occupational Stability of Student Nurse and Midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Q: Question, F: Frequency, Percentage, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

Figure 2: The Effect of Insurgency On the Occupational Stability of Student Nurse and Midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Q: Question, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

Table 3 shows that, 4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, the level of attention to studies by student Nurses and Midwiferies have reduced due to the insurgency, 10% disagreed, 12% wished to be neutral, 30% agreed and 44% strongly agreed. It is also presented in Table 3 that 42% of them strongly disagreed that, conducive learning environment has not been affected by the insurgency in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri, 28% disagreed, 10% were neutral, 14% agreed while 6% strongly agreed. On the position that, student Nurses and Midwifery in the College study under insecure condition and fear of possible attack by Boko Haram insurgents, 10% of them strongly disagreed, 16% disagreed, 4% were neutral, 30% of them agreed and 40% of them strongly agreed with the position. It is also presented that, 46% of them strongly disagreed that, the performances of student Nurses and Midwiferies in practical works outside the College has not been affected by the insurgency, 26% disagreed, 10% remained neutral, 12% agreed and 6% strongly agreed. As presented in table 3, 6% of them strongly disagreed with the view that, student Nurses and Midwiferies performances in class activities and examinations in the College has been affected by the insurgency, 10% disagreed, 16% preferred to be neutral, 28% agreed and 40% strongly agreed. The average or mean score for all the Qs in table 3 is 10. Q1 has the highest SD score of 54.8 while Q5 recorded the lowest SD score of 38.8. Q2 had 44.0 SD score while Q3 recorded SD score of 43.6 and Q4 had SD score of 53.6. The average or mean SD score for all the Qs in table 3 stood at 46.96.

Table 3: The Effect of the Insurgency On the Academic Performances of Student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Q: Question, F: Frequency, Percentage, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

Figure 3: The Effect of the Insurgency On the Academic Performances of Student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

Q: Question, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

Table 4 shows that 4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, insurgency has effect on the training of student Nurses and Midwiferies, 10% disagreed, 16% were neutral, 28% agreed and 42% strongly agreed. Table 4 also shows that, 8% of them strongly disagreed that, insurgency affects the occupational stability of student nurse and midwife Trainers, 16% disagreed, 6% remained neutral while 24% agreed and 46% strongly agreed. On H3 as table 4 presented, 6% of them strongly disagreed that, insurgency has effect on the academic performances of student nurses and midwiferies, 14% of them disagreed, 10% wished to be neutral while 26% of them agreed and 44% of them strongly agreed. 

Table 4: Testing the Hypotheses

H: Hypothesis, F: Frequency, Percentage, SD: Strongly, D: Disagreed, N: Neutral, A: Agreed, SA: Strongly Agreed, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation

Source; Researcher`s Field Survey (2020)

Presentation on Table 4 shows that, H1, H2 and H3 recorded equal average or mean score of 10. H2 has the highest SD score of 52.4 while H1 had the lowest SD score of 46.0 and H3 had 47.2 as it SD score. The average or mean score for all the hypotheses in table 4 is 48.53. Table 4 shows that the highest responses for H1, H2 and H3 are Strongly Agreed (SA) signifying that, the hypotheses formulated to guide the study tested positive and guided the study as anticipated.

Major Findings

The study found that: 

• The training of student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri has been affected by the insurgency

• The quality of training giving to student Nurses and Midwiferies in the college has also been affected by the insurgency

• Allocation for training of student nurses and Midwiferies has been rationalized due to the insurgency

• The performances of student Nurses and Midwiferies Trainers has been affected by the insurgency

• Posting of student Nurses and Midwiferies to public hospitals outside Maiduguri for practical work has been affected by the insurgency

• Several student Nurse and Midwife Trainers have left College of Nursing Maiduguri because of the insurgency

• The number of student Nurse and Midwife Trainers has reduced in the college

• Teaching and learning environment in the college is unsecured

• Experienced and qualified student Nurse and Midwife Trainers from outside the North-East region are unwilling to take up appointment with the College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri because of the insurgency

• Attention to studies has reduced among student Nurses and Midwiferies in the college due to the insurgency

• Learning environment has been negatively affected in the college by the insurgency

• The fear of possible attack is high among student Nurses and Midwiferies in the college

• Students` performances in practical work outside the college has been affected by the insurgency

• Students` performances in class activities and examinations in the college have been affected by the insurgency

Based on the findings made, the study arrived at the conclusion that, insurgency has negative effect on the training of student Nurses and Midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri. The study also reached the conclusion that, the insurgency has effect on the occupational stability of student nurse and midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri. It also came to the conclusion that; the insurgency has effect on the academic performances of student nurses and midwiferies in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri.

Recommendation

As a result of the conclusion drawn by the study, the following recommendations are made

• Special security and risk allowances should be provided for student nurse and midwife Trainers in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri. The insurgency has forced many Trainers to quit their appointment with the college. Providing such allowances to the available Trainers will stimulate them to stay and forget the desire of leaving the college to another one in a more secure environment. It will also give the Trainers the notion that, government is aware of the security risk and condition they are facing in the discharge of their official duty

• Adequate security should be provided for student Nurses and Midwiferies on practical work outside the college and Maiduguri. Most of the roads connecting Maiduguri and the other local government areas in Borno state are not safe. General hospitals in those areas need student Nurses and Midwiferies to come and carry out their practical work with them. But, this need has been hindered by the insurgency. Special escort team of military personals should be constituted to escort student Nurses and Midwiferies to public hospitals they are posted to for practical work outside Maiduguri. After the completion of their practical work, they should also be escorted back to the college in Maiduguri to continue their class activities

• Internal security in College of Nursing Maiduguri should be improved. Improving security within the college premises does not mean deploying military squad to established a camp in the college. It means deploying plain cloth security personals in a disguise manner to interact with student Nurses and Midwiferies as well as Trainers so as to gather intelligent information on possible threat of attack and to report such development to the military for necessary measures to avoid the threat from been carry out. This will be better than establishing a military camp there in because doing so instead of protecting the college will rather make it vulnerable to attack. Effective internal security network will make the college environment conducive for teaching and learning activities. Attention to class activities and performances in examinations will improve. The fear of possible attack among student Nurses and Midwiferies as well as their Trainers will also vanish

• Investment especially in knowledge is an unending project. It is never affected by conflict in civilize societies because of the believe that education is the greatest accelerator of nation building. Allocation and funding of student Nurses and Midwiferies training should not be rationalized due to the insurgency but rather, it should be increased so that quality and competent Nurses and Midwiferies will be trained. This will go a long way in ameliorating the deteriorating health condition those displaced by the insurgency are suffering from. Most of the Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps around Maiduguri are facing acute shortage of health personals as assistance rendered by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in this aspect receives minimal complimentary effort from the government. The sensitivity of health as an issue especially under the insurgency makes the need for increase funding and allocation to training of student Nurses and Midwiferies necessary in College of Nursing and Midwifery Maiduguri

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